

FOUCAULT'S INDIVIDUAL AND SWARM-DISCOURSE

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INTRODUCTION

The perceived intelligence that emerges when large groups of individuals meet is often referred to as ‘emergence’ or ‘swarm intelligence’: “When you have a few ants together, not much happens . . . But get 10,000 ants together, or a critical mass, and something spectacular happens. They build bridges and just generally exhibit collective intelligence or swarm intelligence" (Christian Jacob Quoted in Tetley). Swarm intelligence emerges from the self-interested actions of individuals within a collectivity; when enough self-interested individuals act selfishly on a micro-scale, patterns emerge on the macro-level, and a larger macro-intelligence may emerge:

In the simplest terms, [emergent systems of intelligence] solve problems by drawing on masses of relatively stupid elements, rather than a single, intelligent ‘executive branch.’ They are bottom-up systems, not top-down . . . In these systems, agents residing on one scale start producing behavior that lies one scale above them: ants create colonies; urbanites create neighborhoods; simple pattern-recognition software learns how to recommend new books (Johnson 18).

A large group does not, by any means, act as a single-minded entity. However, even with multiple counter-productive or disruptive elements present—as in rush-hour traffic, for instance—an apparent collective intelligence emerges. With no central organization to speak of, and with only micro-level individuals composing a given group, a higher-level intelligence may emerge on the macro-scale.

As self-organizing systems are a relatively recent field of study (Johnson 11-23), the borders of ‘emergence’ as a discourse are by no means fixed. It has been suggested that, with the advantages of hindsight, it is possible to recognize numerous thinkers who

were working in the area of self-organizing systems long before it was considered a discourse, as such: “Indeed, some of the great minds of the last few centuries—Adam Smith, Friedrich Engels, Charles Darwin, Alan Turing—contributed to the unknown science of self-organization” (Johnson 18). At first glance, Foucault may seem to be a likely candidate to add to this list of anachronistic self-organizing system scholars.

Foucault’s model of power is often discussed as a bottom-up system, where individuals are active participants functioning within an infinitely complex network of power relations:

Foucault’s bottom-up model of power [. . .] focus[es] on the way power relations permeate all relations within a society, enables an account of the mundane and daily ways in which power is enacted and contested, and allows an analysis which focuses on individuals as active subjects (Mills 34).

However far individuals as active subjects may be from emergence, such thought, at the very least, is sympathetic with a model of bottom-up, self-organizing systems with emergent swarm intelligence.

However, this strand of thought is not consistent throughout Foucault’s philosophy. On the contrary, it is also often stated, “Foucault has tried to move away from the notion of the subject, that is, he has attempted to think about the forms that human societies take without rooting his analysis in the examination of individuals” (Mills 4). While he is willing to discuss individual encounters with discourse, and even individuals as further perpetuating a given discourse, Foucault is resistant to the idea that individuals directly form—or even meaningfully shape—a given discourse. In fact, when asked who or what is behind the formation of discourse, Foucault did not respond by

directly answering the question, but rather by explaining that this particular question is not the question that interests him most:

What is this anonymous system without a subject, what thinks? The 'I' has exploded . . . this is the discovery of the 'there is'. There is a *one*. In some ways one comes back to the seventeenth century point of view, with this difference: not setting man but anonymous thought, knowledge without a subject, theory with no identity, in God's place (Foucault, cited in Eribon 161; Mills 106).

Given this response, it is clear that Foucault is—at least overtly—less concerned with the conditions of the emergence of a discourse than he is with its internal workings. Even in works that are clearly focused on the meeting of the individual with larger discursive forces, such as *Discipline & Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, Foucault seems to be only implicitly concerned with the production of discourse by individuals, while more explicitly exploring the act of individual internalization and the reproduction of already existent discourses and corresponding power relations.

Ultimately, despite the fact that Foucault is outwardly resistant to the idea of individuals at the centre of his models of power and discourse, critics such as Sarah Mills are not entirely incorrect in describing Foucault's model as "bottom-up" (Mills 34). This essay will explore what is implicit in a great deal of Foucault's writings, to uncover the link to a bottom-up model of discourse analysis within Foucault's seemingly top-down system. With this end in mind, this essay will explore three distinct forms of groups in the context of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, *Discipline & Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, as well as several of Foucault's essays and lectures,

to show the multiplicity of ways individuals contribute to discourse, ultimately concluding that a discourse is entirely composed of the actions of individuals as an emergent form of swarm intelligence. However, this essay will also acknowledge the connotations of the term ‘individual,’ of which Foucault was extremely wary, and provide a definition of ‘individual’ that does not betray Foucault’s project of resistance to the liberal humanities.

This analysis will have several implications. First, it will show that the differences between Foucault’s early, seemingly top-down, works (*The Archaeology of Knowledge*), and his later, seemingly bottom-up, works (*Discipline & Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*) are not irreconcilable; it will show that Foucault’s model is best understood as neither a bottom-up, nor a top-down system, but as a synthesis of the two. Second, it will show that the individual—often thought to be absent from Foucault’s work—is, in fact, an integral part of his model. Finally, this essay will show that Foucault’s model of discourse has not been rendered obsolete by the recent study of swarm intelligence; indeed, it is through a perspective informed by the theory of swarm intelligence that Foucault’s seemingly contradictory works become connected, and several of Foucault’s observations become unambiguous.

SWARM-DISDISCOURSE IN *THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*

To understand the nature of Foucault's archaeological model, and to recognize this model as a form of swarm phenomenon—to understand the crucial role individuals play in a self-organizing system that both shapes and is shaped by the individuals over whom it has authority—one must first appreciate how Foucault's archaeological work differs from his work at other points in his career. Though it is certainly true that “Foucault's own work is a matter of both continuity and discontinuity” (McHoul and Grace *ix*), Foucault's concerns do shift in some important ways. In the first period, often called Foucault's ‘archaeological period,’ Foucault “concentrates on the description of discourses or disciplines of knowledge” (McHoul and Grace *viii*). However, it is not easy to discuss Foucault's methodology or framework in the archaeological period. In his first two major works—*The History of Madness*, which is often translated into English as the dramatically abridged *Madness and Civilization*, and *The Order of Things*, which reached best-seller status—Foucault did not formally outline his methodology. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* was largely written as an attempt to outline the methodology and goals behind these earlier works: “These tasks were outlined in a rather disordered way, and their general articulation was never clearly defined. It was time that they were given greater coherence [. . .] This book was the result” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 16). However, though it is true that “*The Archaeology of Knowledge* is the main work in which Foucault tries to spell out what he means by ‘discourse’” (McHoul and Grace 33-4), and is the book which best defines the entire impetus behind his early works, it is by no means clear: “This is perhaps Foucault's most difficult work. *The Order of Things* is complex enough as it is; but to try to read a complicated theoretical reflection on it

[. . .] is a near impossibility” (McHoul and Grace 34). Though *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is intended to clarify Foucault’s earlier works, it often has just the opposite effect.

The very difficulty of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* has created a great deal of confusion and debate over just what—if anything—Foucault is trying to accomplish with this work. Rorty expresses this difficulty quite clearly: “*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which strikes me as his least successful book, does seem to be trying to sketch a ‘successor subject’ to epistemology. As far as I can see, however, Foucault never quite decides what that subject is” (Rorty 43, Quoting Foucault’s *The Archaeology of Knowledge*). On top of this, Foucault seems to revel in the fact that his argument is not outlined in a clear, linear fashion: “I am not proceeding by linear deduction, but rather by concentric circles, moving sometimes towards the outer and sometimes towards the inner ones” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 128). Be that as it may, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* does provide a discussion of Foucault’s theoretical concerns and tactics in his archaeological period that is simply not present in the other works; this fact alone makes *The Archaeology of Knowledge* absolutely indispensable to any discussion of Foucault’s early works. The fact that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is both crucial to understanding Foucault’s early work, and an extremely difficult text makes it an essential text to discuss in any theoretical analysis of Foucault’s work.

The Archaeology of Knowledge exemplifies the drive throughout Foucault’s archaeological period to discuss systems of truth or knowledge on a strictly discursive level. Throughout this text, it becomes clear that “the working hypothesis of archaeology [is] that truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production,

regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements” (Davidson 221). The central drive of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is to reveal the fact that all that is said is dependent on the complex network of discursive relations that determine what can be said at a given moment, so that, ultimately, “[t]ruth is inseparable from the procedure establishing it” (Deleuze 63). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is primarily concerned with exploring the connection between what can be said, and the network of relations that define both the true and sayable.

However, no clear cause and effect relationship emerges between the various elements—subject, statement, discourse, and archive—of this truth-creating process. It is often stated that Foucault wants to refute that the sovereignty of the individual drives this process: “Foucault focused not on literary texts and the creativity of their authors, but rather on the anonymous underlying structures and rules of formation of discourse in general” (Mills 26). However, Foucault goes even further than simply refusing to acknowledge the supremacy of the speaking subject, and presents a model of discourse that functions as a feedback loop, where every element has a role in influencing the nature of all other elements. In such a way, Foucault not only questions the supremacy of the subject, but also questions the supremacy of each element involved in the feedback loop. Indeed, the symbiotic relationship between all of the elements discussed in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* lies behind Foucault’s methodology, and even his use of the term ‘archaeological’ as a metaphor to define this methodology: “The interest, to invoke the archaeological analogy once more, is not in the particular object (text) studied but in the overall configuration of the site from which it was excavated” (Gutting 34). However, though it initially seems as though “the question of origins is never raised at

all” (Deleuze¹ 4), to miss the causal loop within Foucault’s model is to miss the very essence of the system of knowledge he discusses.

Foucault does not present a stagnant system, but a radically dynamic system, full of an infinite amount of change; yet he does not explicitly provide “casual explanations for these changes, leaving his readers somewhat at sea with regard to how he evaluates the interplay of intentional action, socioeconomic changes, particular interests, and accidents” (Rabinow10). But perhaps there is a place to begin, and perhaps it is possible to grasp the causal chain within Foucault’s model, simply by outlining the ways in which each element influences the larger system. This chapter will argue that there is a great deal implicit throughout *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that does outline a chain of causality, where the individual or speaking subject plays just as crucial a role as any other element in the system of knowledge. However, this chain of causality is not linear, but circular, and ultimately functions as a form of swarm phenomenon.

Because the system of knowledge outlined in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* ultimately functions as a feedback-loop, there is no privileged place to begin a discussion of it. However, because “Archaeology describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 148), it seems appropriate to begin this paper by discussing discourse, and the role it plays in the chain of causality. The first challenge is unravelling just how Foucault defines the term ‘discourse.’

¹ It is often noted that, though Deleuze is an excellent critic of Foucault, Deleuze often focuses on his own theoretical project while seeming to focus on Foucault’s projects, and much of what Deleuze discusses is, in fact, absent from Foucault’s writing: “There is something in Foucault that Deleuze’s own project requires that he transform. So that no matter how interesting and important Deleuze’s own project, we must be concerned mostly with what he gives us of Foucault and, perhaps even more, with what he puts aside” (Bové xxxiv). This paper will continue to use Deleuze’s criticism only where it clearly refers to an element of Foucault’s work, or supplies a criticism of Foucault’s approach in itself—rather than merely because it differs from Deleuze’s approach.

McHoul and Grace note that Foucault defines ‘discourse’ in a different way than many theorists:

Among critical discourse theorists such as Foucault, the term ‘discourse’ refers not to language or social interaction but to relatively well-bounded areas of social knowledge. And, with exceptions, it is almost impossible to find this use of the term in other—largely Anglo-American—approaches. (McHoul and Grace 31)

Because Foucault’s usage of ‘discourse’ differs from other common usages, the first step in defining ‘discourse’ is to forget the associations one typically makes with the term, and think of ‘discourse’ as a homonym. The more predominant use of ‘discourse’ discusses how individuals use speech in interactions. This analysis is done very much at the level of communication itself, and typically “looks for techniques of ‘saying’—how turns are taken in conversations, for example” (McHoul and Grace 31). Foucault’s usage differs greatly, but he, himself, admits that he uses ‘discourse’ in a number of senses, “treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’ (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 90). The three senses in which Foucault uses discourse ought not be treated as mutually exclusive, and any particular discourse—which is, of course, a specific example of discourse in general—ought to be treated with both of the latter two elements as components, so that a given discourse must be seen as an identifiable group of statements that function as a certain type of regulated practice.

Initially, it seems as though the relations from which discourse emerges drive discourse both as an identifiable group of statements, and as a certain practice. Foucault insists that any given group of statements can only become identified as an individualized

discourse “if one can show how they all derive (in spite of their sometimes extreme diversity, and in spite of their divisions in time) from the same set of relations” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 76). In short, the material relations within society that drive the organization of a particular discourse—including other discourses—define the nature of a discourse. In a somewhat circular move, Foucault describes the type of relations that determine the nature of a discourse as ‘discursive relations,’ and insists that these relations are not either internal or external of discourse, but a part of it, and exist on the fringes of discourse itself:

Discursive relations [. . .] are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather [. . .], they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them, etc. These relations characterize not the language (*langue*) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice. (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 50-1)

But this seems highly paradoxical. How can something at the fringes of the discursive, which is neither truly discursive nor purely external to discourse define the nature of a discourse? This need not be problematic in the least if one could simply appeal to some independent truth, or non-discursive fact, but because “[t]here are no criteria for truth and falsity which apply outside a particular discursive practice, no universal standards of logic or rationality” (Matthews 150) in Foucault’s model, one cannot appeal to *a priori* fact as the starting point of discourse. The fact that individuals experience everything within a discursive context seems to be behind Foucault’s insistence that one must

“substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 52-3) and must “define these *objects* [. . .] by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 53, author’s emphasis). Yet this hardly clarifies the paradoxical nature of these discursive relations, and perhaps only further complicates the situation.

Nonetheless, these discursive relations play a crucial role in Foucault’s model, and must be understood if *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is to be understood. But what *are* these discursive relations? Keeping in mind Foucault’s aforementioned assertion that these discursive relations are an aspect of a given discourse itself, it seems likely that these relations are composed of statements themselves. This initially seems untenable, simply because discourse seems to determine the nature of a given statement: “[the statement] represents not the average, but rather the whole statistical curve. In effect the statement is to be associated not with the transmission of particular elements presupposed by it but with the shape of the whole curve to which they are related” (Deleuze 4). In this quotation, Deleuze is highlighting the fact that within *The Archaeology of Knowledge* the statement not only expresses what it says at the surface level, but also expresses the entire network of relations that are necessary for the statement to mean what it means. But if a whole set of relations is behind the emergence of the statement, how can the statement be the root of discursive relations? Interestingly, though it appears as though the statement is, itself, subject to the discursive relations, there is also some evidence to suggest that statements have a role not only in creating a material base of discourse, but also in defining the rules of a discourse:

we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes. (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 31)

It is clear from the above quotation that no statement emerges free of the influence of the already existing discursive relations. However, the fact that the statement itself has a role in determining the nature of other statements, excluding their presence by asserting its own, suggests that statements, themselves, also come to play a part in the discursive relations. The process whereby a statement comes into being as a product of various relations, but modifies those relations and becomes part of the network of relations that determine the nature of the following statements, appears to be a chain of circular causality:

the statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced. Thus the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 118)

In short, a statement is produced, which only means with reference to the larger discursive relations. However, because these discursive relations are composed at least partially of meaningful statements, the new statement itself modifies the nature of the discursive relations that allowed it to appear, and in turn influences the emergence of new

statements—all of which will also change the nature of the discursive relations, and therefore all of the statements that will be made and will become part of the discursive relations.

Foucault seems content to deal with this relationship between statement and discourse, and sees little place for the psychological individual within this network. The materiality of the statement, the discourse, and the discursive relations all seem to make what an individual thinks or intends of absolutely no relevance: “in the end it will not matter that the unconscious is not, as we believed and affirmed, the implicit edge of consciousness; it will not matter that a mythology is no longer a world-view, and that a novel is something other than the outer slope of a lived experience” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 223). Despite the individual’s secret, internal nature, how the individual is able to interact appears to be primarily shaped by the discursive relations, which have “been a condition of historical possibility for the interplay of exchanges” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 179). Because the individual is shaped by his or her discursive surroundings, it is common to read Foucault as treating individuals as purely the product of discourse: “Where previous nominalists thought of the self as making up its own categories, Foucault did not imagine that there is any self, any ego, and I, waiting to do that. Each human subject – you, me – is an artifact” (Hacking 235). Indeed, this seems to be how Foucault, himself, would prefer to have people think about his framework, simply because the individual/subject is so central to most accounts of the history of knowledge. When Foucault contrasts his account to that of Noam Chomsky, he suggests that the reason Chomsky is able to place so much weight on the individual while he places so little, has nothing to do with one thinker being correct and the other

incorrect, but rather is related to the fact that both are saying what they must to subvert the current trend in their respective fields.

For Foucault, the difference between himself and Chomsky is that they are simply writing out of two very different discursive contexts. Chomsky must, Foucault insists, place so much weight on the role of the subject because he “has been fighting against linguistic behaviourism, which attributed almost nothing to the creativity of the speaking subject” (Foucault in Chomsky & Foucault 15). Foucault, on the other hand, is reacting against the history of thought, which typically elevates the importance of isolated individuals:

each discovery should not only be situated and dated, but should also be attributed to someone; it should have an inventor and someone responsible for it. General or collective phenomena on the other hand, those which by definition can't be ‘attributed,’ are normally devalued: they are still traditionally described through words like *tradition, mentality, modes*; and one lets them play the negative role of a brake in relation to the ‘originality’ of the inventor. In brief, this has to do with the principle of the sovereignty of the subject applied to the history of knowledge. (Foucault in Chomsky & Foucault 15-6; Foucault restates this point later in the debate: 32-3)

In this instance, it is quite clear that Foucault must put so little weight on the individual's importance in his archaeological studies of the history of knowledge because the history of knowledge typically grants too much importance to the role isolated individuals play in the production of knowledge. Foucault is quite clear that his discourse is consistent with the conditions that brought about his discourse—as is the case with all discourses—

and were the discursive circumstances surrounding his account different, the role of the individual might very well be different from its somewhat diminished state in his current account. It is not that he wants “to deny their existence, or deny that [individuals/subjects] could ever be the object of a description” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 179), but rather that the history of knowledge typically undervalues the degree to which “individuals operate in a conceptual environment that determines and limits them” (Gutting 33). When Foucault insists that he wishes “to step back from them, to shift the level of attack of the analysis, to reveal what made them possible” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 179), he ought not be interpreted as insisting that the individual has no place in his model, but only that, because he is writing in a particular discursive atmosphere, he chooses to focus on other elements as playing a dominant role in shaping discourse.

In fact, there is a great deal in Foucault’s account that suggests the individual has just as much right to be viewed as the sovereign cause of discourse as any other element. After all, while the discursive relations allow for a variety of potential statements to emerge, archaeology is only concerned with those that do emerge: “The analysis of statements and discursive formations [. . .] wishes to determine the principle according to which only the ‘signifying’ groups that were enunciated could appear. It sets out to establish a law of rarity” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 133-4). While any number of possible statements could appear—all of the statements that are not specifically forbidden by the discursive relations—a relatively small number of them actually come into being. There may be room in Foucault’s account to suggest that individuals have a role in choosing which of these allowable statements come into being. Foucault does allow a

small amount of choice in the particular use of concepts, however limited individual choices may be by the network of relations influencing them: “It is not the theoretical choice that governs the formation of the concept; but the choice has produced the concept by mediation of specific rules for the formation of concepts, and by the set of relations that it holds with this level” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 82). In short, the individual is able to choose his or her use of concepts within the parameters of the current context. Furthermore, Foucault does acknowledge, “there can be no signs without someone, or at least something, to emit them. For a series of signs to exist there must – in accordance with the system of causality – be an ‘author’ or a transmitting authority” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 104), but suggests that the same subject is not behind all of the statements that one individual emits. He uses the example of the author of a novel, and suggests that while the same author is behind the utterances of multiple characters within a novel, the same subject does not produce all of the statements in the novel, simply because they come from different characters with different places in the larger discursive framework (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 104-5). This shows both just how important discursive position is to Foucault, and how many different discursive positions one individual may be able to access—almost as though one individual is able to occupy the positions of multiple subjects.

But a couple of points must be clarified. First, it must be acknowledged that this is only a problem if the speaking subject is defined entirely by his or her discursive relationality—which, as we have already seen, Foucault does, not because he is defining some external object where the individual is unimportant, but because it is his chosen perspective (Foucault in Chomsky & Foucault 15-6, 32-3). On the other hand, this

implies that Foucault has separated the psychologically complex author of a novel from the characters as speaking subjects who are bound to particular relations. However, if the speaking individual—or in this case, the author—is afforded the same freedom in selecting which statements he or she will produce, or even within which discourses he or she will make statements—as is allowed to the subject in the particular use of a given concept—then there is no reason to believe that an individual's choice is not responsible, at least partially, for the direction that a given discourse ultimately takes. Clearly, this choice does not take place in a vacuum, and the individual cannot simply make statements that are completely without discursive precedence, or they will appear to be utter nonsense. However, because it is the individual who actually speaks the statements that enter into a discourse, and because these statements change the discourses they enter (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 51), the individual is ultimately able to shape the direction the discourse will take simply by speaking. If the individual is able to choose to actually make some statements from the body of statements that are possible, then simply by mediating the discursive rules and choosing to enact some statements rather than others, the individual is able to influence the directions in which a discourse is likely to change.

Even if this is the case, the speaking individual still has various discursive restraints that he or she is personally unable to overcome. Yet the speaking individual also has a particular role in forming a discourse that simply cannot be ignored. This mixture of freedoms and restraints can be best described by outlining discourse in a swarm context. A critical mass of individuals enter into a relationship with one another, and make various statements, which produce a discursive context, and ultimately create

the rules of the discourse of which they become components. The very act of speaking a statement both reflects and refines the discursive rules: “what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of *rules* that are immanent in practice, and define it in its specificity” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 51). This discursive situation allows for only certain statements to be meaningful to the larger discursive community, and in such a way, limits the meaningful statements that are possible:

one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new; it is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention, or to be aware, for new objects suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground [. . . the object] exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations. (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 49)

Though making truly ‘new’ statements—statements that are not all but said within the existing discursive relations—is extremely difficult, surely an individual can choose which statements to make out of all allowable statements within a given discourse. An individual can even choose to make statements that are not allowed, though these will appear as nonsense to the larger discursive community—just imagine Einstein going back in time and explaining General Relativity to pre-Copernican astronomers. This is one reason why the psychology of a speaking individual is of no concern to Foucault; because a statement’s meaning is related to a discursive network that no individual has complete access to. While the speaker of a statement may mean certain things, his or her statements can mean very different things to the larger discursive network. A tremendous amount of discursive context must exist before one can express anything through language, and no individual can create either the entire discursive network, or any part of

it exactly as he or she might desire. Nonetheless, this discursive framework, which is beyond the control of any individual, is created by the actions of individuals.

In addition, not everyone has equal ability to speak within a given set of relations. Foucault suggests that by asking who is speaking in a given discourse, one realizes the large number of formal constraints that limit not only what can be said, but who can say it: “The status of doctor involves criteria of competence and knowledge; institutions, systems, pedagogic norms; legal conditions that give the right – though not without laying down certain limitations – to practice and to extend one’s knowledge” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 55-6). Undoubtedly, particular social structures shape the permissible circulation of knowledge in such a way. No matter how knowledgeable a given homeopath may be about kidneys, a homeopath is likely to face legal intervention if he or she decides to perform kidney surgery, while a surgeon would have no such problems, even if the surgeon happens to know less about the kidneys than the homeopath. This causes differences between the homeopath and the surgeon, not merely in the ways that the two individuals speak about the kidneys, but in the sort of knowledge that each individual seems able to possess. Even if the homeopath masters medical theory surrounding the kidneys, he or she will be limited by the inability to extend his or her practical knowledge by repeatedly performing kidney surgery, in a way that is open to the surgeon. Furthermore, a homeopath faces greater obstacles than would a qualified surgeon in not only being published in medical journals, but in convincing the medical profession of anything, simply because one is more free to speak, and is seen as more qualified by virtue of the types of knowledge he or she is able to practice and extend than the other. Interestingly, that some individuals would undoubtedly take the advice of a

homeopath over that of a surgeon also highlights the fact that discourse is not monolithic. Nonetheless, even though a given discourse limits who is able to shape it, an individual's choice is perfectly able to influence the direction of a given discourse within which an individual is qualified to speak in a way that is consistent with Foucault's model. The area of medicine concerned with kidney surgery is undoubtedly shaped by the individuals who are active participants in the discourse, regardless of how limited such membership may be; limited access to a discourse does not neutralize the importance of individual speakers who *are* able to contribute to a discourse.

This is not to suggest that the individual has much claim to being sovereign in Foucault's model; but neither do 'discourse' or 'the statement' have much of a claim to sovereignty. Acknowledging that the individual has as much of a place in the discursive feedback-loop as any other element hardly suggests that the individual occupies a position of sovereignty in determining the nature of discourse. If one begins to contemplate the role of individual choice in the origins of all the statements that make up a discourse, then the role of individuals becomes central—indeed, discourse would not exist at all if not between individuals—even though a given individual's role may be rather miniscule in relation to the entirety of a discourse. After all, the statement “is linked not only to the situations that provoke it, and to the consequences that it gives rise to, but at the same time, and in accordance with a quite different modality, to the statements that precede and follow it” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 31). Once an individual utters a statement, it becomes a part of a discourse, and because discursive law is defined by the statements that make up a given discourse, making a statement changes which statements one will be able to make in the future. This model may not allow for a

single statement to either create an entire discourse from nothing, or to abolish an entire discourse into nothingness, but it does allow for individual actions to change the direction in which discourse will develop, in the same way that a school of minnows—a classic example of swarm phenomenon (Jacob Quoted in Tetley)—can change direction simply because one minnow decides to change course. It is true that it is, if not completely impossible, then very difficult to predict how one individual will shape such a system. However, one must acknowledge that the entire system is composed of the actions of such individuals, who do shape the systems that result from their actions.

Ultimately, though this swarm-model fits quite well with Foucault's model of discourse, Foucault's model seems to be unable to discuss certain consequences that follow from this model, simply because it is unwilling to discuss an individual's psychological or mental state. While an individual's secret intentions are largely ineffectual to what they will mean to the larger discursive network, the secret intentions of multiple individuals become crucial in a swarm. For Foucault, only that which is actually said and exists materially within the discursive framework is related to discourse: "the statement not only needs this materiality; its materiality is not given to it, in addition, once all its determinations have been fixed: it is partly made up of this materiality" (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 112). Surely, this is bound, once again, to Foucault's insistence that "it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of its enunciations should be defined" (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 60-1). Quite simply, whatever one may or may not think or feel only becomes discursively relevant once it is actually stated and comes to exist materially within a certain network of relations. But this may limit how well one is able

to account for sudden discursive shifts. Just as a large number of drivers may be theoretically more likely to follow a particular driver who decides to pass a stopped car on the shoulder of a highway if a large portion of the swarm is also contemplating a similar course-change, so too does it seem more likely that a particular statement will change the discourse in a given direction if many individuals share the same secret—and according to Foucault’s model, irrelevant—thoughts, or even feelings, about a current discourse. These thoughts and feelings only become discursive with material expression in the form of a statement, but are very relevant to the workings of a discourse even before they are uttered. Indeed, the thoughts and feelings of large numbers of individuals—non-discursive though these may be—may go a long way to explaining the sudden discursive shifts and ruptures Foucault is particularly curious about.

It should not be ignored that, as much as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a formal outline of Foucault’s methods in his archaeological period, it is his manifesto and war cry in a battle against traditional histories of knowledge. Foucault has drawn the battle lines; there are those who are on his side, who realize the importance of outside forces in determining what becomes knowledge at any given time, and those who support the opposing army, who see knowledge sprouting from the ideas of particular isolated geniuses. For Foucault the issue is black and white, one or the other:

There is the distinction [. . .] between the *microscopic* and *macroscopic* scales of the history of the sciences, in which events and their consequences are not arranged in the same way: thus a discovery, the development of a method, the achievements, and the failures of a particular scientist, do not have the same

incidence, and cannot be described in the same at both levels; on each of the two levels, a different history is being written. (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 5)

This same battle is less heated today, and there is little reason why one ought to be as militant in overtly denying the role of the individual as Foucault was in his archaeological period². In addition, the recently emergent discourse of swarm-intelligence has opened up understanding of the ways in which isolated individuals whose actions impact a larger group of individuals to form macro-patterns that influence the actions of the isolated individuals who acted in the first place, without any central organization. It is only in recent years that scientists have been able to use swarm-intelligence models even begin to formulate an answer for the question, “how do all my cells manage to work so well together?” (Johnson 13). There is no reason why this discourse ought not be taken further and used to enrich the understanding of Foucault’s model in ways that Foucault, himself, was unable to because of his position in the larger discursive situation. There is a great deal implicit in Foucault’s model to suggest that knowledge is formed as a product of swarm phenomenon.

² Eric Matthews’ *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*—especially Chapter Seven, “Structuralism: Lacan and Foucault”—does quite a good job of outlining the state of French philosophy when Foucault began writing. It is important to recognize both how pervasive existentialism had been in French philosophy when Foucault began his philosophical career, and the degree to which some of the tenants of structuralism seemed to offer a means of resisting existentialism. As existentialism is no longer in a dominant philosophical position, the terms of the macro versus micro battle have certainly changed greatly since Foucault’s time.

THE SWARM AND POWER IN *DISCIPLINE & PUNISH*

Discipline & Punish is quite different from *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in several ways. First and foremost, *Discipline & Punish* is not a complex theoretical treatise, but a history of the development of the modern carceral system, which contrasts the carceral system in two periods: “the first [. . .] typified the punishment of criminals in Europe until about the middle of the 18th century; the second represented the new, ‘gentler’ way of punishment” (Gutting 80). This shift, Foucault insists, was dependent on various aspects of society, and reveals a great deal about society in general (McHoul and Grace 66). The rise of the carceral system did not merely involve developing new carceral techniques, but also techniques that apply to modern civilization as a whole, resulting in “[a] whole chain of phenomena, from anti-masturbation machines for children to the mechanics of prison for adults” (Deleuze 23). In addition, because *Discipline & Punish* focuses “more on the causal origins of institutional structures and less on systems of thought” (Gutting 87), it is typically considered to be a part of Foucault’s second period, which is “more genealogical than archaeological” (Gutting 87). While *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a complex and difficult formalization of Foucault’s archaeological methods, *Discipline & Punish* is a comparatively easy to follow example of Foucault’s genealogical process that contrasts the rise of discipline and the carceral system in modern society with punishment in pre-modern society.

From a swarm perspective, the model of discourse presented in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* seems to outline discourse in a radically free state, simply as emerging from the relationships between individuals in a social network; the actions of these individuals define the limits of the very network that comes to limit them. However,

Foucault came to be increasingly interested in the role power plays in determining what becomes knowledge, and the role that knowledge plays in determining power. This is not to say that the intersection of power and knowledge was not a concern in Foucault's archaeology. However, Foucault often discusses the degree to which he had trouble framing his concerns in such a way: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about [. . .] but power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word" ("Truth and Power" 115). Rather than focusing on the internal workings of discourse, his genealogical works focus on strategies that influence the direction the swarm will develop. However, this is not done at the expense of a profound discussion of discourse and knowledge; ultimately, the genealogical model of power presents power and knowledge as inseparable: "there is no power relation without correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (*Discipline & Punish* 27). Power and knowledge are not simply related in this model, but are difficult to isolate from one another. It is true that "the analysis of how human beings govern themselves and others by the establishment of 'regimes of truth' [. . .] encompass[es] the underlying thematic unity of Foucault's work" (Smart 72). While this provides a bridge between *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline & Punish*, it is not meant "to deny the existence of developments and changes in formulation and emphasis between works and biographical periods" (Smart 72). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* discusses power-knowledge from the standpoint of pure knowledge, largely severed from a given material reality. *Discipline & Punish*, on the other hand, shows the other half of the power-knowledge interrelation, treating the emergence of modern carceral civilization as the result of an interrelation of countless

power relations, all of which are at least partially discursive in nature.

Critics often struggle with how Foucault views the nature of the carceral system, simply because the force behind this system seems to be elusive and paradoxical. On the one hand, it is clear that Foucault does not see a powerful class as ultimately responsible for a given system; but this does not greatly help the search for who *is* responsible:

“Foucault rejects the notion that there is any calculating class of agents behind the scenes [. . .] But what impersonal force then allows Foucault to talk of discipline univocally, as a strategy by which a whole people are controlled?” (Donnelley 29). Likewise, the system of power-knowledge discussed in *Discipline & Punish* does not initially appear to be rooted in the actions of individuals. As was the case in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, an individual is simply too helplessly determined by his or her larger discourse/power context for the individual to appear at the centre of Foucault’s model of power/knowledge:

These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but [. . .] the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. (*Discipline & Punish* 27-8)

This tends towards the conclusion that individuals are far from controlling the system of power/knowledge, and are, in fact, helpless in this system’s clutches. Mills is, perhaps, not far from the mark in asserting, “it is power/knowledge which produces facts and the individual scholars are simply the vehicles or the sites where this knowledge is produced”

(Mills 70). This seems, at first glance to be not only “‘unthinkable’ and seemingly insane” (Mills 70) but also highly paradoxical. Through a perspective informed by an understanding of swarm intelligence it becomes clear that an individual does not produce power/knowledge; a whole system of individuals does.

Foucault’s discussion of the micro-physics of power supports utilizing a swarm-discourse model to clarify Foucault’s position. The micro-physics of power, which are manifested in the political technologies of the body³ function to control the entire system, not with grand expressions of power, but by exploiting infinitesimal power relations spread across the entirety of the population: “this technology is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse [. . .] it implements a disparate set of tools or methods. In spite of the coherence of its results, it is generally no more than a multiform instrumentation” (*Discipline & Punish* 26). The micro-physics of power organize space and time to control the most minute distributions of individuals, in an attempt to control how one spends increasingly small amounts of time, to ultimately control large amounts of time and space: “The body does not automatically align itself into a clockwork composition of actions: it has to be trained to do so [. . .] it actively seeks to cultivate a certain type of body on the basis of knowledge considered ‘true’” (McHoul and Grace 69). While controlling increasingly small units of space and time, the micro-physics of power create knowledge about individuals. Once again, knowledge is inseparable from power—so much so that Foucault often joins the two in the term, ‘power/knowledge’—and what conforms to the current power-structure is perceived to be truth. In this sense, the micro-physics of power attempt to create the truth about individuals.

³ The techniques that attempt to control an individual by controlling the individual’s body.

This model of power may appear to be most coherent from an extreme macro-perspective with power emanating from an institution or apparatus; however, on closer inspection it becomes clear that no institution or apparatus controls society from above: “relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state” (“Truth and Power” 122). Rather, institutions and apparatuses only enjoy influence within the framework of power-relations as they appear in the swarm of individual interactions because “the state [. . .] is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations” (“Truth and Power” 122), and also “because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations” (“Truth and Power” 122). In Foucault’s model, institutions and apparatuses are simply incapable of controlling the system from above. However, institutions and apparatuses attempt to manipulate society from below⁴, by influencing individual relations and interactions, and seem to realize that the macro-order of society emerges from these micro-order interactions.

The idea that the micro-physics of power are deployed in an attempt to determine the nature of the emerging swarm-discourse is consistent with Foucault’s more general description of power. Functioning in an essentially relational manner, this power is acted and related to, not possessed: “one should decipher in [the micro-physics of power] a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess [. . .] In short this power is exercised rather than possessed” (*Discipline & Punish* 26). This power appears as a circular chain of relations. First, power is exercised

⁴ Foucault also states in “Truth and Power” that a model of power that envisages macro-control by a particularly powerful individual or group entirely misses the productive aspect of power that makes it possible for people to tolerate being ‘ruled’ (121-123), and that political theory needs to abandon a model that views the powerful as sovereign—“We need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done” (121); both sentiments are echoed—nearly verbatim—in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*.

by the relationship between those seemingly with and those seemingly without power. Next, this relationship is internalized, so that—as is the case with panopticism—individuals are “caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers” (*Discipline & Punish* 201). Disciplinary technologies such as panopticism ensure that the free interaction of individuals is disrupted and individuals are isolated (*Discipline & Punish* 201), in an attempt to produce “homogeneous effects of power” (*Discipline & Punish* 202), which are then transmitted throughout all power-relations. This set of power-relations is thus incorporated back into the masses, legitimizing the first moment of power and maintaining the current order of power-relations⁵.

Once power-relations are forged, they exist only insofar as they are legitimized—in the sense that they are not rejected *en-masse*—by a critical mass of individuals. Foucault is particularly interested with this issue, and spends a great deal of time questioning how individuals are “made to accept the power to punish, or quite simply, when punished, tolerate being so” (*Discipline & Punish* 303). It becomes evident in Foucault’s rejection of a social contract model the degree to which individuals are complicit in their own oppression: “The theory of the contract can only answer this question by the fiction of a juridical subject giving to others the power to exercise over him the right that he himself possesses over them” (*Discipline & Punish* 303). Of course, it is not only an individual’s power that is being used against him or her, but rather the combined power of everyone who supports—or in many cases, merely does not oppose—this system. Foucault is quite right to oppose too strict a social contract model because the individual is not free to escape the hold of the prison system if only he or she will

⁵ Notably, this is a causal chain, which seems to pose the question of how such a set of relations came to be. Though Foucault does not address this issue directly, one need only look to a military coupe or civil war to see how this first moment of power-relations comes to be established.

reject his or her unspoken social oath. Indeed, the individual is utterly helpless within the clutches of the prison system, and can disown the authority of his or her captors until his or her dying breath without changing his or her fate.

Furthermore, the individual is powerless and ultimately unnecessary, because one individual neither grants legitimacy, nor is capable of preventing a system from gaining legitimacy. What is needed to create or topple a system is not an individual's approval or rejection of it, but a critical mass of individuals simultaneously approving of or rejecting its authority. The carceral system is, in such a way, the embodiment of a large-scale approval of the right to punish: "the great carceral continuum [. . .] constituted the technical and real, immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right to punish" (*Discipline & Punish* 303). Though Foucault does not explicitly discuss the number of individuals required to reach such a critical mass, it is clear that social change involves a change in a great deal of—if not all—relations across society: "the State consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible, and [. . .] Revolution is a different type of codification of the same relations" ("Truth and Power" 122). Clearly, the right to punish is, itself, rooted in the action of a great deal of the discourse/power swarm. Though a single individual is simply irrelevant to the emergent discourse/power relations, the system is entirely composed of the interactions of such seemingly irrelevant individuals.

Though it is apparent that the entire power/knowledge network influences individuals in this model, it is not immediately clear how the individual influences the larger power/knowledge network. Foucault only implicitly treats the individual's interaction with different levels of organization within a civilization. However, by

beginning at the micro-level and proceeding upwards into the macro-level, it can be seen that there are three main levels of swarm intelligence, each relating to both of the others. These three levels reveal how discourse and power rise out of the white noise of the unorganized masses, into structured units of power/knowledge. Though these three levels are often indistinguishable from one another in a practical setting, conceptually distinguishing between these three levels reveals both that power structures are rooted very much in the actions of individuals within a large network, that power/knowledge functions as a mixture of bottom-up and top-down power, and just how complicit individuals are in their own oppression.

The first level is most similar to discourse as it is treated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*; it consists of “[t]he crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individuals merging together, a collective effect” (*Discipline & Punish* 201). Though bound in a complex tangle of power and discourse, individuals are here relatively free to relate to power-relations as isolated beings with little or no formal social organization. At this level, individuals are members of numerous discursive communities, and meaning emerges from the various networks of individual statements and meanings in unpredictable ways. Foucault provides us with an example of the methods used by individual members of the first level to attempt to manipulate overall meaning. He discusses the way in which accounts of criminals who were soon to be executed were either published to profess the guilt of the punished, or were published “simply as propaganda, before any trial had taken place, in order to force the hand of a court that was suspected of being too tolerant” (*Discipline & Punish* 66). Such publications could be composed by individuals who—though doubtless members of discursive communities

—did not necessarily share official membership in the formal structures of power. However, “the effect [. . .] of this literature was equivocal” (*Discipline & Punish* 67), and it was just as likely that the publications would make the criminal a hero as a villain: “The condemned man found himself transformed into a hero by the sheer extent of his widely advertised crimes, and sometimes the affirmation of his belated repentance” (*Discipline & Punish* 67). Though the individual is, at the first level, free to independently publish whatever he or she chooses, there is simply no way of ensuring what one’s publication will mean to the larger discursive network. As was discussed at length with reference to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, though creating a statement is up to an individual, creating the network within which the statement comes to mean is up to the entire discursive network, and is beyond the grasp of any given individual.

The very nature of the first level of swarm-discourse—as existing between individuals who are outside of, and potentially alienated from, state apparatuses—may even stack the cards against the individual attempting to vilify the criminal. After all, the criminal, by the sheer fact that he or she is outside of the formal social structure, and is alienated from the state apparatuses, can be recognized as having a great deal in common with the other members of the first level of swarm-discourse:

Against the law, against the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, the constabulary or the watch, against taxes and their collectors, he appeared to have waged a struggle with which one all too easily identified. The proclamation of these crimes blew up to epic proportions the tiny struggle that passed unperceived in everyday life. (*Discipline & Punish* 67)

The suggestion here is that because the first level of discourse takes place outside of state institutions and apparatuses, the chances are good that members of the first level will become alienated from the other levels, and side with anyone—in this case, the criminal—who challenges the upper levels. There seems to be a mechanism in the first level that roots for the under-dog, and resists any attempts to support the will of level two institutions.

The second level is composed of the formalized state apparatuses and institutions and the internal discourses of their operation. It is clear that Foucault believes that apparatuses sprout from the larger network of social relations, which shape the type of knowledge contained in the institutions; this knowledge then attempts to shape other knowledge and social relations, in a feedback loop similar to the one already discussed with reference to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Such a feedback loop is a recurrent theme throughout Foucault's writing:

The apparatus is always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. That is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. (“The Confession of the Flesh” 196)

All of these individuals form a swarm-discourse of power that is personified by the apparent life-form of the state apparatus or institution. However, it would be a mistake to view an apparatus as either stable or monolithic; as the swarm that emerges from countless discursive and power relations, apparatuses and institutions are constantly shifting, simply because they are subject to an infinite network of micro-relations:

an institution is composed of *opposing* forces likened only to a state of war.

Disciplinary institutions thus require ever-alert attention to the ‘government’ of all composite parts and the invention of certain tactical manoeuvres to ensure the implementation of disciplines. (McHoul and Grace 70)

Ultimately, through the emergent intelligence of combined individuals, the state apparatuses and institutions seem to come alive, and seem to have not only their own minds, but their own desires. Once an institution or apparatus comes into being, it immediately attempts to shape the very relations which brought it into existence: “the apparatus is essentially of a *strategic* nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc” (“The Confession of the Flesh” 196). This does not change the fact that it is these relations that determine the nature of the institution or apparatus, and that the apparatus is just one element within a loop of circular causality.

Nevertheless, the apparatuses and institutions are more stable than power/knowledge relations are on the first level, and are even endowed with self-defence mechanisms—such as legal status. Barring outright rejection of the legal legitimacy of a discourse on this level, individuals or groups can only formally change level two power/knowledge structures by adhering to the internal rules for allowable change—rules that are formalized into the legal status of discourse on this level. It is for this reason that, though the reform to the carceral system that Foucault painstakingly documents throughout *Discipline & Punish* “did not have a single origin [. . .] it was prepared, for the most part, from within, by a large number of magistrates and on the basis of shared

objectives and the power conflicts that divided them” (*Discipline & Punish* 81). Though such institutions are subject to level one discourse, the first level shifts more rapidly than the internal rules that are applied to an institution. The result is that institutions and apparatuses are often able to weather discourse/power shifts that radically alter the first level. The fact that the carceral reform discussed throughout *Disciplining & Punish* only became law when it sufficiently affected those inside the carceral institutions shows both that such institutions are composed of individuals, and that the structure of such institutions changes more slowly than does the first level⁶. Consequently, the instability of level one makes specific changes to level two difficult, as the informal relations of level one are likely to shift before the will of level one is able to change the discourse/power relations on level two.

Apparatuses and institutions on the second level function by attempting to remove the relations between individuals, limiting the chances of emergence on level one and attempting to eliminate the power of a mass of individuals. Institutions attempt to separate, and therefore neutralize, masses of individuals with disciplinary technologies, turning individuals into disciplinary individuals (*Discipline & Punish* 227) and docile bodies—“bodies that not only do what we want but do it precisely in the way that we want” (Gutting 82). Though such a process takes place in all of the disciplinary technologies Foucault discusses throughout *Discipline & Punish*, it is perhaps most clear in panopticism. The panopticon isolates level-one individuals so that the relatively unpredictable interplay of discourse and power-relations of the first level “is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individuals” (*Discipline & Punish* 201).

⁶ Though it is not one of Foucault’s direct concerns, logistic problems/expenses associated with a fundamental change to the carceral system also mean that change to the formal, recorded, legislated discourse are slower than at the level of pure interpersonal discourse.

Furthermore, the panopticon makes it possible to form entire classificatory schemata: “among schoolchildren it makes it possible to observe performances [. . .] to map attitudes, to assess characters, to draw up rigorous classifications and, in relation to normal development, to distinguish ‘laziness and stubbornness’ from ‘incurable imbecility’” (*Discipline & Punish* 203, quoting Bentham’s *Works* 60-4). In the process, disciplinary technologies not only classify what already exists, but create a new state of existence, forming that which they name. This is present not only in legal regulation, but also in “the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through mediation of the complete hierarchy that assumed the capillary functioning of power” (*Discipline & Punish* 198); by regulating even the smallest actions, whether or not they have legal significance, disciplinary technologies attempt to define a hierarchy where every individual has a specific place: “not masks that were put on and taken off, but the assignment to each individual of his ‘true’ name, his ‘true’ place, his ‘true’ body, his ‘true’ disease” (*Discipline & Punish* 198). This is a clear example of an apparatus attempting to increase its own power by abolishing the first level of discourse. As was discussed earlier, the only threat to an established power-structure is the emergence of a collective rejection of it. The second level acknowledges this fact by attempting to neutralize the first level.

However, it must be noted that though level two attempts to manipulate the first level, the efforts of the other levels are simply absorbed by the discursive white noise, and the institutions ultimately have little more power to have their statements taken as they would like than any other individual. This is evident in the process of normalization, which functions as a disciplinary tactic to structure regularity: “The

intention may have been to produce regularity, but the *effect* was quite the opposite: a multiplicity of disparate and variegated identities. Individuality is a modern phenomenon” (McHoul and Grace 72). Level two is simply unable to overwhelm the free-flowing discourse on level one, and though institutions on level two may have the ability to ensure that a large number of individuals absorb statements produced on level two, it is unable to ensure that people will grant these statements the meaning that the institution would like them to have.

The third and final level that presently requires discussion is composed of particularly powerful individuals, who are legally granted the right to modify the institutions and apparatuses of the second level. Though a powerful individual has more of a theoretical say in the shaping of overall life—both at a group and individual level—this say is reduced to the power to put-forth one’s opinion and officially shape level two, and is often reduced to the ability to attempt to manipulate those who ultimately form the basis of the powerful individual’s power; at this level, the pre-modern sovereign used “a policy of terror [. . .] to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign” (*Discipline & Punish* 49). In this case, the sovereign not only equates him- or herself with absolute power, but also with general social order, so that a given crime is not merely against a vague social order, but against the sovereign: “this portion [of retribution] belonging to the prince is not in itself simple: on the one hand, it requires redress for the injury that has been done to his kingdom [. . .] but it also requires that the king take revenge for an affront to his very person” (*Discipline & Punish* 48). Punishment, in this instance, is quite literally a message to the

first level that the sovereign is inseparable from justice and personally controls the social order on the all levels.

However, there are no guarantees that the will of the third level will come to pass; no matter how powerful one is, it is never certain that others on any other level will a) interpret the opinion of the powerful individual as he or she does, b) act on this opinion in all instances, or c) treat the will of the powerful individual as worth regarding. Perhaps the best example of this comes at the moment of France's carceral reforms. Despite the fact that the old form of punishment was both wasteful and potentially dangerous for those in power, those with the most power resisted the change: "It was as if the sovereign power did not see, in this emulation of atrocity, a challenge that it itself threw down and which might one day be taken up" (*Discipline & Punish* 73). However, because the new system was perceived as benefiting so many facets of society, the sovereign will was overwhelmed, as people from all walks of life spoke out vehemently against the old mode of punishment: "inside and outside the legal apparatus, in both everyday penal practice and the criticism of institutions, one sees the emergence of a new strategy for the exercise of the power to punish" (*Discipline & Punish* 80-1). Furthermore, even the powerful are subject to the overall system of meaning that emerges from the interrelation of the masses, regardless of how actively they try to shape it. It is for this reason that the sovereign is eventually forced to recognize the benefits of the "new 'political economy' of the power to punish" (*Discipline & Punish* 81), and the reforms are eventually implemented from inside the existing power structures. The sovereign's initial resistance to reform turned into the institutions—with the authority granted them by the sovereign—implementing the reforms from within, even though "the reformers did not form a

majority of the magistrates” (*Discipline & Punish* 81). This shows that both the larger system of meaning, and the physical basis of the sovereign’s power are rooted not in the sovereign him or herself, and are not rooted in the power of the institutions, but in the masses⁷.

Everyone takes place in the first level of swarm-discourse; even the most powerful member in society becomes part of this chaotic and spontaneously emerging network of signification. This suggests that even when Sovereign rule is absolute, the Sovereign’s will does not necessarily come to pass absolutely. In addition, the elimination of the third level is one of the key changes that took place in the shift to the modern period. This is one of the reasons Foucault is critical of Marxism: “taking the French Revolution as their model, they are trying to cut the head off the king in a world where there is no king” (Gutting 87). Modern power has increasingly replaced the third level with the second. While there are fewer and fewer monarchs, social institutions and an entire micro-physics of power flourish in modern society.

Clearly, a swarm-discourse model of Foucault sheds a great deal of light on the seemingly paradoxical elements of *Discipline & Punish*. Rather than having one clear ruler, modern society is characterized by a breakdown of the third level of discourse/power, and an increased proliferation of more or less formal institutions on the second level: “there is no single centre of power, no privileged ‘us’ against which a marginalized ‘them’ is defined. Power is dispersed throughout society, in a multitude of

⁷ Though it is not one of Foucault’s primary concerns, it is notable that those with the ability to purchase arms *en masse* can arm whom they like; thus, those in power can force a greater number of dissenters to be necessary for swarm-emergence by increasing the strength of those who are likely to support the current order—in many ways, the entire second level can be seen as just such a build-up. Given this military advantage, the percentage of the population required for a fundamental change of discourse/power-relations to emerge is not merely the ordinary critical mass, but critical mass plus the number of casualties that will be suffered because of the military advantages possessed by those currently in situations of power.

micro-centres” (Gutting 87). On the one hand, power and discourse do not appear to emerge from the actions of isolated individuals, but only from a critical mass of individuals. Further, because of the necessary heterogeneity among a group large enough to reach critical mass, what emerges is unpredictable and impossible to control. For Foucault, a system of top-down power is equally impossible as a system of bottom-up power, as even powerful individuals have the nature of their power determined by emergent power-legitimizing discourses. On the other hand, the advantages of those with power are hard to dismiss, and it is difficult to ignore the state apparatuses and institutions in any discussion of power. Still, it is clear that these apparatuses would cease to exist if every member of society—or, at least a sufficient proportion of society for a critical mass—simultaneously refused to acknowledge the authority of the current social structure. Quite simply, the micro-scale is the source of all macro-power, and in the modern carceral system, macro-power is exercised primarily by attempting to either eliminate or manipulate the emergence of a discourse that is threatening to the current power-relations by restricting the interactions of individuals on the micro-level.

MANIPULATION OF THE SWARM IN *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME I:*
AN INTRODUCTION

Though the effects of power are present everywhere in the modern world, the carceral system is, in many ways, not an ideal example of how power functions. Though there are microscopic swarm interactions that manipulate individuals in the carceral system, the fact that the carceral system overtly attempts to physically control individuals seems to undercut these subtleties. While *Discipline & Punish* goes a great way towards outlining the infinitesimal forms of manipulation present in the prison system, and while it illustrates the ways in which many of the carceral technologies function in society as a whole, it does little to express the limit of these technologies—to show just how infinitesimal and manipulative they can be. The example of the carceral system seems to carry with it an air of oppression, and calls to mind a stereotypical top-down system, despite Foucault's continual insistence to the contrary. It seems likely that Foucault, himself, recognized the pitfalls of his choice to discuss the carceral system in *Discipline & Punish*, for only one year after publishing it, Foucault published *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*, or as it was originally titled, *The Will to Knowledge (La Volonté de savoir)*. In many ways, volume one of *The History of Sexuality* is constructed on the same conceptual framework as *Discipline & Punish*. However, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* is able to go further than *Discipline & Punish* because sexuality seems to function with far more intricacy, and much more in the absence of overt control than does the carceral system. Whereas *Discipline & Punish* shows the grandiose side of modern power, volume one of *The History of Sexuality* shows the subtle side, shows the extent to

which power not only oppresses, but also generates, and shows the extent to which individuals truly are complicit in their own oppression.

As is the case with his other works, it is crucial to understand Foucault's conception of power if one is to understand *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*. Judith Butler, in her interrogation of the source of power in *The History of Sexuality*, insists that individuals cannot be the force driving Foucault's model of power, simply because power shapes individuals to such a great degree: "What propels power? It cannot be human subjects, precisely because they are one of the occasions, enactments, and effects of power" (Butler 87). This is a common enough point, and implies that because individuals are so shaped by macro-level power—which they certainly are—individuals cannot possibly be the cause of this macro-level power. However, this point falls apart when examined from a swarm perspective. As was suggested numerous times in the preceding chapters of this paper, simply because power takes individuals as its object, and even though power shapes individuals themselves, one must recognize a chain of circular causality, where the same people who propel power are, themselves, caught in the network of power-relations that shapes the limits of possible statements and actions.

A great deal has already been suggested that sheds light on Foucault's conception of power. It has been shown that it is only between individuals that power exists, that it is individuals who provide the physical force required to maintain and perpetuate power, and that individuals have a role—however slight, in this model—in choosing how to interact within a particular framework of power—and as was shown earlier, even a small degree of freedom can dramatically shape the direction a discourse or power-structure

will eventually take. All of these points hinge on the idea that power is essentially relational; this is best understood by first examining what Foucault insists power is not:

By power, I do not mean ‘Power’ as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive deviations, pervade the entire social body. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 91)

The fact that Foucault rejects the conception of power as something exerted by some over others goes a long way to discredit Butler’s objections. This shows that, as was the case in *Discipline & Punish*, Foucault’s model treats discourse/power as relational. Power is not a group of institutions oppressing individuals, is not merely a mode of subjugation, and is not one group dominating another. From Foucault’s conception, power exists in all of the relationships between individuals: “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 91). All of these points counteract a model that sees power as exercised on some by others. In Foucault’s model, power is immanent, spread throughout all of society, influencing every interaction in any number of possible ways.

This is one of the reasons Foucault objects to the repressive hypothesis—popularized by Freud—which insists that there remains a Victorian silence surrounding sex in contemporary society: “At the beginning of the seventeenth century [. . .] Sexual practices had little need of secrecy [. . .] But twilight soon fell upon this bright day,

followed by the monotonous nights of the Victorian bourgeoisie [. . .] On the subject of sex, silence became the rule” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 3). Because silence is the dominant social order according to the repressive thesis, the only way to overthrow the current order is through “a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, and a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 5). However, because Foucault insists that the Victorian repression of sex did not create a silent society, but “a society which has been loudly castigating itself for its hypocrisy for more than a century, which speaks verbosely of its own silence, [and] takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 8), the silence of society is less of an issue for Foucault than is its continual speech. Freud’s repressive thesis misses how well it, itself, fits into the model of power which has not silenced all discourse on sex, but has elevated certain types of discourse surrounding sex; Freud’s model does not offer liberation through speech, but merely supports the current social order by increasing the medical/scientific discourse on sex: “This discourse on modern sexual repression holds up well, owing no doubt to how easy it is to uphold. A solemn historical and political guarantee protects it” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 5). For Foucault, both the perception of silence and the drive to speech are products of the current power-relations; this gives an idea just how pervasive power is, and the degree to which power is a factor in any interaction.

It is important to note Foucault’s insistence that the omnipresence of power need not lead one to the conclusion that powerful individuals are dominating those without power. Rather, Foucault insists that power’s pervasiveness shows that power is the very

relations between individuals on what I have called the first level—the level of the unchecked swarm:

Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And ‘Power,’ insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 93)

This quote gives the clear impression that Foucault understands power as emerging from a swarm of interactions. The concatenation of which Foucault here speaks seems to be the emergent pattern on the macro-scale of micro-interactions, which function interdependently to create a norm. This macro-pattern is perceived by individuals on the micro-scale, further influences micro-interactions, and in turn is influenced by the emergence of micro-impressions of the power structure. Once again, this model of power presents a feedback loop, where the interactions between individuals create patterns of interactions in a large population, which are perceived by individuals, influence individual interactions, and therefore influence the patterns that will emerge in the future.

The question of how there can be macroscopic acts of power if power is strictly relational is not an easy one to overcome. The answer to this riddle lies in Foucault’s suggestion that even attempts to control many individuals are subject to the larger network of power-relations:

No ‘local center,’ no ‘pattern of transformation’ could function if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if [it] did not gain support from

precise and tenuous relations serving, not as its point of application or final outcome, but as its prop and anchor point. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 99)

In this instance, it is clear that one must consider the model of power presented in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* as greatly similar to the model presented in *Discipline & Punish*. Though *Discipline & Punish* focuses on the rare instances where the macro-sphere exercises overt power over the micro, in both cases the micro-physics of power are very much present, and any macro-strategy must function by splintering itself off into various micro-relations. However, the macro-scale is also checked in this model, so that, ultimately, “he rejects a view of power as monolithic, centralized, and repressive” (Sheridan 170). While *Discipline & Punish* provides an example of one extreme, illustrating how macroscopic, monolithic, and overt power is able to become—though, as we have seen, it is not completely any of these things—*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* shows the other extreme, and exposes just how subtle, microscopic, and pervasive power is able to be. However, the two books are, in fact, exploring two vastly different manifestations of the same type of power. In both cases it is not merely that the macroscopic manipulates the microscopic on numerous fronts, but that the macro and the micro are inseparable so that “There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two different levels (*one microscopic and the other macroscopic*)” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 99-100). The idea that the micro and the macro are two sides of the same coin goes a great distance toward supporting a swarm model of discourse/power which sees each of the two elements shaping the other in a feedback loop.

However, one must account for Foucault's rejection of certain commonalities between the two spheres. After all, Foucault denies that the two spheres are related through uniform similarity:

neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other); rather, one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 100)

This may seem contradictory, but makes perfect sense if one considers that any institution or apparatus is ultimately composed of individuals who live and interact very much at the micro level. In such a way, an institution is shaped by the discursive reality to which those who shape an institution or apparatus are subject. Because individuals compose the physical body of an institution, and because the statements of individuals compose the discursive reality of an institution, it makes perfect sense that, as an emergent swarm quality of individual interactions, institutions would be subject to the same discursive and power relations as individuals. Perhaps this is the reason why "the deployment of sexuality was not established as a principle of limitation of the pleasures of others by what have traditionally been called the 'ruling classes.' Rather it appears to me that they first tried it on themselves" (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 122). The suggestion in this instance is that even 'powerful' individuals are not free from the discursive reality that makes a given state of power-relations more beneficial to them than to others, as even powerful individuals live their day-to-day lives on the first level. This is not to say that there are not particularly powerful groups or individuals—a tempting conclusion

given Foucault's rejection of a top-down model of power. Rather, even those groups or individuals who are perceived as very powerful ultimately only 'have' power⁸ within the complex interrelations that compose all power. Further, the network of interactions that give meaning to a set of relations, making certain individuals powerful—the pure knowledge half of the power/knowledge relationship—emerge from what we are considering to be level one swarm phenomenon. In short, even seemingly faceless institutions are ultimately composed of—and are the result of—the cooperative action of numerous isolated individuals, and function as an emergent macro-swarm from a critical mass of micro-scale individuals.

Nevertheless, the presence of 'strategies' seems to lead to the conclusion that there is an anonymous macro-power conspiring somewhere, and may be behind Butler's assumption that individuals do not propel power in Foucault's model. These strategies are discussed often, though they are invariably accompanied by statements undermining the degree to which these strategies can be seen as originating from an individual: "Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques" ("Subjectivity and Truth" 155). This is one of the points where a swarm-perspective of Foucault's model of power/knowledge is most essential if one is to understand Foucault's framework. Without such an understanding it becomes exceedingly difficult to account for the mixture of very active strategy and an utter lack of centralized power/knowledge that is present throughout volume one of *The History of Sexuality*. Though he admits that "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives" (*The History*

⁸ Foucault rejects the metaphorical language of possession around power, but it is difficult to dispense with completely

of Sexuality, Volume I 95), he does not see this as necessarily leading to the conclusion that there is conscious central organization behind these goals:

this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 95)

Of course, all of this is very consistent with a swarm perspective of power/knowledge. Foucault's rejection of the supremacy of an individual subject has the typically ignored consequence that an isolated powerful individual cannot be any more behind the system of power/knowledge than any other individual. In short, if all individuals are helpless within the greater operations of power, it follows that the powerful are just as shaped by the network of discourse and power-relations as any other member of society. The assertion that "Power is nothing more and nothing less than the multiplicity of force relations extant within the social body" (McHoul and Grace 84) seems to capture Foucault's position perfectly, and emphasizes the degree to which power exists as the relationships between individuals; it is not merely that individual relationships are shaped by power, but that individual relationships on a micro-scale become power on the macro-scale. However, this macro scale *seems* to be something other than a collection of micro-relationships—something larger than one's self—and comes to shape interactions on a micro-level in a chain of circular causality.

It seems as though Foucault conceives of power very much in these terms, and views the strategies that appear to exist on a macro level and belong to some macro-

power as actually rooted in the micro-strategies of individuals, who are part of the social network of relations:

the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 95)

In other words, there certainly are conscious strategies and tactics—just not on the macro-scale. Individuals do scheme and plot within their own sphere. However, nobody is able to determine the shape of relations across society. Ultimately, if a strategy that benefits an individual or group in a small sphere benefits an individual or group on a large macro-sphere, this is because of factors that are simply outside of the individual's control, but happen to be in the individual's favour. Foucault supports this position when he suggests that though very clear macro-tactics often appear, any attempt to find the central organization behind these tactics is frustrated: “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often that case that no one has invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 95). This is not because the central organizers have so effectively hidden themselves behind their power. Rather, Foucault insists, it is because there are no such individuals: “At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 89). Because a model of sovereignty is still used to understand power, it is easy to miss the fact that modern power

functions without waiting for the approval or rejection of any given individual. In Foucault's model, micro-scale individuals may have tactics to control or influence others, and to end up in positions of power—or may end up in positions of power because their actions functioned as a well-thought-out tactic would function. Within a given network of power relations, certain tactics are likely to be more successful than others, and patterns emerge on the macro-level out of micro-tactics. Without any central organization, macro-strategies emerge from micro-strategies, and function as though they were centrally organized. In just such a way, the model of sexuality created by the ruling class for the ruling class became perceived as the norm, and spread throughout all of society (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 122).

The strategies Foucault discusses in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* are particularly potent because they attempt to manipulate the micro-scale. It is important that “[o]ur epoch has initiated sexual heterogeneities” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 37), because this reveals the presence of strategies that multiply the number of perceivable sexualities on the micro-scale, while reducing the chances of emergence. This is key to Foucault's criticism of the repressive thesis, which fails because it assumes that repression has decreased the discourse surrounding sexuality and homogenized sex, while Foucault insists there has been an “unprecedented rise in discussing, writing, and thinking about sex” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 168) and an increase in the number of perceivable sexualities: “Not the exclusion of these thousand aberrant sexualities, but the specification, the regional solidification of each of them. The strategy behind this dissemination was to strew reality with them and incorporate them into individuals” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 44). The continual specification of an increasing number

of sexualities does not merely perform a classificatory function, but a defining function, and takes strides towards creating certain types of individuals on the micro-sphere. Interestingly, this seems to imply that increasing the number of perceivable sexualities in the micro-sphere does not make sexual identity less important, but more important, until an individual's overall identity does not exist without sexual identity. Foucault's discussion of homosexuality provides a concrete example of just such a shift:

The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 43)

Once homosexuality has ceased to be merely an act, but has become an intrinsic characteristic, it becomes the most important thing about an individual. Once homosexuality is made an identity rather than an act, an individual who practices homosexual acts becomes first and foremost a homosexual, and absolutely everything associated with the individual refers back to his or her sexuality: "It was consubstantial with him, less a habitual sin than as a singular nature" (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 43). In such a way, individuals come to perceive themselves as members of increasingly small groups as the number of identities increases and these identities become more important. As individuals come to view themselves as isolated, macro-level emergence becomes increasingly difficult. Though emergence is still possible within the new sub-groups, it is much less likely to emerge on a culture-wide scale.

Though institutions emerge from the swarm, a picture emerges throughout *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* of institutions that attempt to stifle future emergence by limiting the potency of the swarm. This is why “the state relies on institutional integration of power relationships” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 96); by formalizing rules around when change is allowed within the group over whom the institution claims power, and by building the power-relations that were present at the moment of the institution’s inception into its very framework, an institution makes itself immune to the emergence that may take place among the individuals whose collective action created the institution. Furthermore, the institutions Foucault is here concerned with function by attempting to influence the behaviour of individuals on the first level. Both of these trends are visible in Foucault’s discussion of sexuality as a possible object of knowledge:

thus Charcot’s gesture interrupting a public consultation where it began to be manifestly a question of ‘that’; and the more frequent practice of deleting from the succession of dossiers what had been said and had been seen, provoked, solicited by the doctors themselves, things that were almost entirely omitted from the published observations. (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 55-6)

On the one hand, this institution attempts to observe, catalogue, and define the individual, dictating which relationships ought to be seen as both desirable and possible on the first level. This, undoubtedly, influences the patterns that will emerge on the macro-level. On the other hand, the institution also influences how the individuals who work within the institution operate, and only certain types of reporting are permitted. The discourses of this institution are, to some extent, bound to the conventions already adopted by medicine

and academia. These conventions gain additional support in the discussion of sexuality, until any other sort of discourse appears as radical: “The important thing, in this affair, is not that these men shut their eyes or stopped their ears, or that they were mistaken; it is rather that they constructed around and apropos of sex an immense apparatus for producing truth” (*The History of Sexuality, Volume I* 56). As a possible object of truth, the discussion of sexuality became subject to numerous rules and conventions that governed action within the institutional study of sexuality, but impacted how sex was perceived throughout society, on all levels.

Foucault’s model of modern power suggests that the monarchs are dead, the swarm rules, and those who best manipulate the power-relations created by the swarm end up in positions of privilege within the infinite network of power-relations. However, this does not change the fact that “individuals negotiate with structures rather than simply submitting to them” (Mills 28). Ultimately, Foucault’s model insists that one must understand the bond between the micro-scale and the macro-scale if one hopes to understand how power and knowledge operate. Even macro-level institutions and extremely powerful individuals must exist in a world where the discursive network emerges from an extremely large number of individuals in all spheres. The individual is not merely acted upon in this model, but also acts, both to create and modify the larger discursive network, and to decide how he or she will perceive him or herself: “[One] has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another overlap processes by which the individual acts on himself” (“Subjectivity and Truth” 154). This is not a model that is driven by some force other than individuals, as Butler (87) suggests. Rather, this is a model where individuals, quite simply, drive the

entire system. Individuals act on both themselves and others in a way that shapes the discourse and power that emerge from individual interactions, which creates a macro-scale, which, in turn, seems to further shape individuals. While the success or failure of an individual's efforts is greatly shaped by the actions of others, the system that defines the scope of an individual's contributions is rooted in the actions of individuals. If individuals appear to be absent from the motivating force behind this system, it is perhaps because they are so prevalent throughout the system that they become invisible.

CONCLUSION

In “Truth and Power,” Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino ask Foucault to clarify the nature of the bond between the micro-order and the macro-order as it appears in his texts:

One would then have on the one hand a sort of global, molar body, the body of the population, together with a whole series of discourses concerning it, and then on the other hand and down below, the small bodies, the docile, individual bodies, the micro-bodies of discipline. Even if you are only perhaps at the beginning of your researches here, could you say how you see the nature of the relationships (if any) which are engendered between these different bodies: the molar body of the population and the micro-bodies of individuals? (Fontana and Pasquino in “Truth and Power” 124)

The above question is framed very much in line with the concerns of this paper, and is one of the rare occasions where Foucault is forced to confront such concerns directly. However, Foucault’s response does not shed a great deal of light on the nature of the individual in his work: “Your question is exactly on target. I find it difficult to reply because I am working on this problem right now” (“Truth and Power” 124). However, perhaps the problem is not as unique to Foucault’s late thought as he, himself, may have believed. Perhaps, as was the case with power (“Truth and Power” 115), the meeting of the micro-individual with the macro-order is discussed at length in a great number of his works, and perhaps Foucault has already outlined how he perceives the nature of the individual. It seems likely that Foucault simply has trouble phrasing the issue in those terms, specifically.

Clearly, there are individuals in Foucault's model of discourse/power, and he goes to great lengths to discuss their interaction with the macro-order. However, Foucault does not use the words 'individual' or 'subject' carelessly, and the individuals that exist in Foucault's model must be carefully defined. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* shows to what extent meaning is defined not by the sovereignty of the individual or subject, but by the greater discursive network within which the individual lives his or her day-to-day life. However, it is implicit throughout *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that individuals can shape the direction that this discursive network will develop, and that this network is entirely composed of the actions of such individuals. Likewise, *Discipline & Punish* illustrates the degree to which individuals are manipulated and shaped by institutions and powerful individuals. However, it also shows that individuals are the source of all power, and even demonstrates the ways in which institutions are composed of the combined actions of a large number of seemingly helpless individuals. Finally, *The History of Sexuality* highlights the extent to which individuals are manipulated and shaped by society's power-relations, and suggests that even apparent 'human-nature' is a consequence of power. On the other hand, because this definition of human nature ultimately emerges from a mass of individuals, perhaps this definition is not so manipulative as it may seem, and perhaps individuals are always free to change their definitions. The suggestion is the same in all three texts: though a given individual is greatly shaped by his or her larger context and can do little to change this context, a large number of individuals create the entire discursive network, and are the source of all power. A large number of helpless individuals is far from helpless in Michel Foucault's model of power/knowledge.

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